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 “development in the network age without the internet is like industrialization without 
electricity’. (Castells, 2000)   
 
Disparities among countries in their capacity to create and use technology for 
development has persisted for a long time and are now huge.  It is likely to become an 
increasingly significant factor in determining patterns of global development and poverty 
in the 21st century. The last decade’s technological transformations and the emergence of 
the global marketplace have raised the stakes for all countries to be technologically 
connected – to be able to create, adapt and use global technological innovations.   All 
countries face the challenges of participating and competing in the technology-based 
global marketplace and ensuring that technology is harnessed as a tool for human 
development. Yet the nature of those challenges is very different across countries, 
because countries vary hugely in their technological capacity and needs.   This paper 
presents a measurement approach to assessing the technological achievements of a 
country as an aid to policy makers in identifying policy priorities.  It develops a 
Technology Achievement Index (TAI), a composite measure of technological progress 
that ranks countries on a comparative global scale.   
 
A new paradigm of technology and development  
As we enter the network age, some 2 billion people still do not have access to electricity, 
the basic technology of the industrial age.  Global technological innovation is highly 
concentrated in the high-income OECD countries. These countries, with 14% of world 
                                                 
1 This index was developed for the Human Development Report 2001, Making New Technologies Work for 
Human Development published by OUP for UNDP.    2  
population, accounted for 86% of the 836,000 patent applications filed globally in 1998, 
and 85% of 437,000 scientific articles published worldwide (World Bank 2001 and 
WIPO 2000).  Of all royalties and license fees earned world wide in 1999, 54% went to 
the US and 12% to Japan (World Bank 2001).  Despite rapid expansion of the internet in 
developing countries,  the digital divide is still huge; internet users made up over half of 
the US population and nearly a third of the rest of OECD countries, but still 3% or less in 
Latin America and East Asia, and 1% or less in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Arab States. (Nua 2001)  Even old technologies that have been in existence for over a 
century have stalled – in Sub-saharan Africa,  per capita electricity consumption has not 
risen for the last decade and  since 1970,  tractor use rate declined from 1.8 per 1000 
hectares cultivated to 1.5.   (FAO 2000).  Telephones are similarly out of reach for much 
of the developing world – contrast the lines per capita: 594 per 1000 people in the high-
income OECD countries, and 69 in developing countries on average (ITU 2001). 
Wireless phones have spread rapidly in poor countries but even more rapidly in the rich 
countries – widening the communications gap.   
 
These gaps in technological advance can further widen developmental divides in the 21
st 
century of rapid technological transformations that are driving the historic shift from the 
industrial to the network age in which the rewards and penalties of global technological 
advances are increasing.  (Lee 2000)   The breakthroughs in biotechnology and ICT are 
extending the frontiers of advances in medicine, food production, communications, and 
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many other activities that make possible huge gains in human development.  The 
technology sector is also the fastest growing sector of the global economy.  (Lall 2000). 
 
The challenge of rethinking development policies go beyond considering these 
incremental changes, but to a historic shift from the industrial to the network age.  Recent 
breakthroughs in information communications technologies and biotechnologies have led 
to transformations - technological advances are more rapid (e.g. doubling of computing 
power every 18 months), more fundamental  (e.g. breakthroughs in genetic engineering), 
and more dramatically shifting costs (e.g. decline in cost of transmitting trillion bits of 
information from US$150,000 to just 12 cents over the last 3 decades).  The 
developments in  biotechnology and information telecommunications technology codify, 
store, process and communicate information and knowledge.  These advances have 
structural and not just incremental impacts because they are pervasive inputs into almost 
all human activities  and so have  have pervasive impacts throughout the society.  These 
transformations are intertwined with economic globalization leading to a historic shift, 
from the industrial to the network age.     Production, research, and many other activities 
are restructured into ‘networks’ of individuals and organizations specialized into niches 
of expertise, with the costs of communications driven down to zero and geographical 
boundaries falling.     
 
 
The network age is changing the way – by whom and where – technological innovation is 
created and diffused.  Global research and development activities are increasingly  4  
privatized and globally networked.  Corporations have  resources and the ownership 
(patents) to finance R & D and take products to market.  They take cutting edge 
innovations and carry them across the globe through direct foreign investments and 
licenses.  Entrepreneurs with start-up companies take to market higher risk technological 
innovations, financed by venture capital.  (Lall 2001)   Global markets and global rules of 
intellectual property shape incentives and diffusion. 
 
A new map of technology creation and diffusion is emerging. Centres of cutting edge 
global technology innovation are the ‘hubs’ that spin in the synergy of four inputs needed 
for technology development: knowledge, market opportunities, finance and incentives.  
Top scientists from around the world congregate in these hubs.  So do foreign direct 
investment, technology stocks and venture capital.  All in a global network, working 
collaboratively, migrating from one global laboratory or incubator to the next – the hubs 
and their actors circumnavigate the globe. 
 
Developing technological capacity 
Not all countries need to be on the cutting age of global technological advance.  But 
every country needs the capacity to understand and adapt global technologies for local 
needs.  It is often mistakenly assumed that technology transfer and diffusion are relatively 
easy, that developing countries can simply import and apply knowledge from outside by 
obtaining equipment, seeds and pills. But for firms or farms to use a new technology—to 
identify its potential benefits, to learn it, adapt it and use it—requires new skills and the 
ability to learn and develop new skills with ease (Lall, 2000).  For example, a study from  5  
Thailand shows that four years of education triples the chance that a farmer will use 
fertiliser effectively. (Lipton et at, 2001). Furthermore, with today’s rapidity of 
technological advance, the skill and knowledge required is the adaptability to mastering 
new technology continuously.   
 
Beyond the capacity to use of adopting new techniques, developing countries also need  
capacity to invent and adapt new technologies. Global markets will not develop cures for 
malaria, cheap wireless computers, or pest resistant cassava – products with huge gains 
for the well being of poor people but not much profit potential.  Poor countries need to 
foster their own creativity to use both local and global knowledge and science to find 
technological solutions to their development problems.  Centres of excellence in the 
‘South’ can do much to produce technology tools for tackling poverty.  
 
There is a long history of efforts to develop science and technology in developing 
countries.  In the network age of global markets and technology networks, nurturing 
technological creativity and access to global technologies requires flexible, competitive, 
dynamic economic environments, institutions in private and public sectors, and a 
minimum of physical infrastructure. Three kinds of capacity are particularly critical in 
this new environment.  First, technological change dramatically raises the premium every 
country should place on investing in the education and training of its people.  And in the 
network age, primary education will not suffice – the advanced science and engineering 
skills developed in secondary and tertiary schools, as well as vocational and on-the-job 
training are increasingly important.   Second, the capacity to develop policies that  6  
manage technology such as intellectual property rights and risks of socioeconomic, 
environmental and health consequences.  Third, the capacity to be connected to and 
participate in the global technology development networks. 
 
A number of developing countries – or parts of them – are well connected to global 
networks.  Concentrated in North America,  Western Europe and Japan, global hubs of 
innovation are emerging in developing countries such as Bangalore (India), El Ghazala 
(Tunisia), Sao Paolo (Brazil), and Gauteng (South Africa).  Among the 46 top global 
hubs ranked by the Wired magazine ranking, 9 are in Asia, 2 in South America, 2 in 
Africa (Hillner 2000)  Developing countries are competitive in global markets for 
technology intensive products.  Korea, Singapore, China, Mexico, Malaysia are among 
the top 15 exporters of high tech products and outpace Ireland, Canada, Sweden and other 
long industrialized countries.    Private sector investments in research based technology 
sectors are increasing (Chako).  Migration creates diaspora, which in turn creates 
business networks.   Take the strong link between Silicon Valley and Bangalore, built on 
the Indian diaspora. A global labour market is in the making in skill-intensive 
professions, and the diasporas strengthen the social ties in economic networks as they 
invest at home, but also facilitate contacts for market access. (Kapur 2001) 
 
And most significantly, public and private sector efforts are producing breakthroughs in 
adaptations that meet the needs of human development, from the public initiative to 
develop a low cost computer in Brazil to India’s simputer, a $300 computer that is 
wireless and runs on batteries, to malaria treatment in Vietnam that combined traditional  7  
herbal knowledge with modern science. (Simputer Trust 2000; Kirkman 2001, WHO 
2000). 
 
Assessing national capacity -  Technology Achievement Index (TAI) 
Concept and features   
In reviewing its technology technology policies, a useful  starting point is a realistic 
assessment of its current situation in technological progress and in monitoring its 
progress. This paper proposes a composite index of technological achievement (TAI) – 
reflecting the level of technological progress and capacity of a country to participate in 
the network age. A composite index helps a country situate itself relative to others, 
especially those farther ahead. Many elements make up a country’s technological 
achievement, but an overall assessment is more easily made based on a single composite 
measure than on dozens of different measures. Like other composite indices in Human 
Development Reports such as the Human Development Index, the TAI is intended to be 
used as a starting point to make an overall assessment, to be followed by examining 
different indicators in greater detail.  
 
The index aims to capture technological achievements of a country in four dimensions:  
•  creating new technology; 
•  diffusing the adoption of new technologies; 
•  diffusion of long existing  technologies that are still basic inputs to the industrial 
and the network age; 
•  building a human skill base for technological creation and adoption. 
 
The index focuses on outcomes and achievements rather than on effort or inputs such as 
numbers of scientists, R & D expenditures, or policy environments.  This is because the 
causal relationship between these inputs and outcomes are not well known.  For example, 
does a larger number of scientists lead to more output in technological advance?  Do 
countries that spend more on R & D achieve more?  8  
 
These approaches differ from some other indexes of technological advance that have 
been developed.  The Technology Index published in the Harvard Competitiveness 
Reports focuses on the enabling policy environment for technological innovation and 
diffusion.
3  The Index of Technological Progress developed by Rodriguez and Wilson 
focuses only on information telecommunications technologies.
4  
 
The TAI  is not a measure of which country is leading in global technology development, 
but focuses on how well the country as a whole is participating in creating and using 
technology. Take the United States—a global technology powerhouse—and Finland. The 
United States has far more inventions and Internet hosts in total than does Finland, but it 
does not rank as highly in the index because in Finland the Internet is more widely 
diffused and more is being done to develop a technological skill base throughout the 
population.  
 
Two particular concerns influenced the design of this index:  
first  to be as relevant for the broad range of the world’s countries, especially developing 
countries with low levels of technological advance, and to be able to discriminate among 
these countries.  Large proportions of people in these countries still do not  have access to 
‘older’ technologies such as telephone, electricity, agricultural mechanisation, motorized 
transport.  It was important to include a broad range of ‘new’ and ‘old’ technologies;  
                                                 
3  Warner
3 developed an Economic Creativity Index, of which one component is the Technology index, 
itself using either the Innovation Index or the Technology Transfer Index.  The index is built in the context of 
competitiveness ranking countries by the ‘economic creativity index’.  The conceptual framework is stated as 
“nations can link themselves to the global technology engine by being centres of innovation themselves, or 
by facilitating technology transfer and rapid diffusion of innovation. ‘   But the index is focussed on the 
enabling environment than on the outcome, and on the environment that prevails in the country that make 
for technological vitality.  There is a great deal of value judgement in the choice of indicators used – for 
example IPR is seen as an indicator of innovation.  There is no indicator to show that aggressive use of 
compulsory licensing or parallel imports or generic drugs as an indicator of proactive policy to diffuse 
technology.  It covers 61 countries.  The innovation index is highly correlated with patents.  Full 
documentation needs to be reviewed.  The coverage is mostly OECD countries plus the transition 
economies and a handful of developing countries.  It does not distinguish adequately among developing 
countries. 
4 Rodriguez and Wilson
4 developed an  ‘Index of Technological Progress’.  It focuses on ICT because it 
is the leading technology and combines televisions, fax machines, personal computers, Internet hosts and 
mobile phones.  Consumption of technologically advanced commodities is not necessarily a good measure 
for ‘technological advance’ of a country.  Thus, for example, high income/low population countries like 
Kuwait and Qatar rank higher than Korea, Russia.  9  
second, to be directly policy relevant to the challenges of the wide range of countries.  
 
Components of the index  
The TAI focuses on four dimensions of technological capacity that are important for 
reaping the benefits of the network age. The indicators selected relate to important 
technology policy objectives for all countries, regardless of their level of development:  
•  Creation of technology. Not all countries need to be at the leading edge of global 
technological development, but the capacity to innovate is relevant for all countries 
and constitutes the highest level of technological capacity. The global economy gives 
big rewards to the leaders and owners of technological innovation. All countries need 
to have capacity to innovate because the ability to innovate in the use of technology 
cannot be fully developed without the capacity to create— especially to adapt 
products and processes to local conditions. Innovation occurs throughout society, in 
formal and informal settings, though the current trend is towards increasing 
commercialisation and formalization of the process of innovation. In the absence of 
perfect indicators and data series the TAI uses two indicators to capture the level of 
innovation in a society. The first is the number of patents granted per capita, to reflect 
the current level of invention activities. The second is receipts of royalty and license 
fees from abroad per capita, to reflect the stock of successful innovations of the past 
that are still useful and hence have market value.  
•  Diffusion of recent innovations. All countries must adopt innovations to benefit from 
the opportunities of the network age. This is measured by diffusion of the Internet—
indispensable to participation—and by exports of high- and medium-technology 
products as a share of all exports.  
Higher-technology goods present important opportunities to developing countries. 
Many high-technology sectors are among the most dynamic in the global economy. 
Upgrading the technology content of the manufacturing sector diversifies the 
economy and creates opportunities in new markets. 
The Internet is far more than a tool for rich countries. By dramatically increasing the 
access to information while decreasing the cost, the Internet has vast potential to aid 
political participation, increase people’s incomes, and in improving healthcare.   10  
•  Diffusion of old innovations. Participation in the network age requires diffusion of 
many old innovations. Although leapfrogging is sometimes possible, technological 
advance is a cumulative process, and widespread diffusion of older innovations is 
necessary for adoption of later innovations. Two indicators used here—telephones 
and electricity—are especially important because they are needed to use newer 
technologies and are also pervasive inputs to a multitude of human activities. Both 
indicators are expressed as logarithms and capped at the average OECD level, 
however, because they are important at the earlier stages of technological advance but 
not at the most advanced stages. Thus while it is important for India to focus on 
diffusing electricity and telephones so that all its people can participate in the 
technological revolution, Japan and Sweden have passed that stage. Expressing the 
measure in logarithms ensures that as the level increases, it contributes less to the 
index.  
•  Human skills. A critical mass of skills is indispensable to technological dynamism. 
Both creators and users of new technology need skills. Today’s technology requires 
adaptability—skills to master the constant flow of new innovations. The foundations 
of such ability are basic education to develop cognitive skills and skills in science and 
mathematics. Cognitive skills are hard to define and measure. There have been some 
limited attempts of cross-country comparisons of skills, such as the International 
Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) and the Trends in Mathematics and Science Study 
(TIMSS). They are, however, very limited in their coverage, particularly when it 
comes to developing countries. Instead, mean years of schooling is used as a proxy.  
This measure gives a good indication of the overall level of basic educational skills in 
the population, notwithstanding the fact that education quality varies from country to 
country. The second indicator used to gauge human skills is the enrolment in tertiary 
education in science, mathematics and engineering. This measure gives an idea of the 
current effort in developing advanced skills in science and mathematics. Every 
country needs this skill base to be able to adapt and innovate new technologies.  
Though it would be desirable to include indicators of vocational training, these data 
are not available.   11  
 Weighting and aggregation  
The methodology used to calculate the TAI is similar to the human development index: a 
simple average of the dimension of the index, which in turn are calculated based on the 
selected indicators. The TAI has eight indicators, two in each of the four dimensions: 
•  Technology creation, measured by the number of patents granted to residents per 
capita and by receipts of royalties and license fees from abroad per capita. 
•  Diffusion of recent innovations, measured by the number of Internet hosts per capita 
and the share of high- and medium-technology exports in total goods exports.  
•  Diffusion of old innovations, measured by telephones (mainline and cellular) per 
capita and electricity consumption per capita. 
•  Human skills, measured by mean years of schooling in the population aged 15 and 
above and the gross tertiary science enrolment ratio. 
 
Two of the indicators, telephones per capita and electricity per capita, are also expressed 
as logarithms and capped at OECD average levels, as discussed above. Just as in the HDI, 
the value of the different indicators are normalised to a scale from 0 to 1 using goalposts, 
such that an indicator value that is equal to the upper goalpost will be normalised to 1 and 
a value equal to the lower goalpost will be normalised to 0, according to the following 
formula: 
value minimum observed   -    value maximum   observed
 value minimum   observed   -    value actual
  index  Indicator  =  
 
However, in the HDI these goalposts are set to reflect a desirable standard. For example, 
the upper goalpost for life expectancy is set to 85 years – a society with this life 
expectancy can be said to have succeeded in providing a long and healthy life for its 
citizens.   In contrast, there are no such desirable levels for the indicators in the TAI: they 
have in common the property that higher levels are better, but it is impossible to set a 
“desirable” level of patenting activity or of high- and medium- technology exports. For 
this reason the goalposts used in calculating the index are simply the observed minima 
and maxima of the indicators: for each indicator, the best-performing country is assigned 
a value of 1 and the worst a value of 0 for the index calculation. The obvious drawback of  12  
this approach is that it complicates trend analysis: when values change over time, 
goalposts also change, making the indices of two different time points incomparable. 
However, the TAI was not designed to measure change over time.  
 
A second important issue is that of weighting of different indicators and dimensions. In 
the TAI, the four dimensions each contain two indicators. The index for each dimension 
is calculated as the simple average of the indicator indices in that dimension. The TAI, in 
turn, is the simple average of these four dimension indices. The indicators in each 
dimension are given equal weight, and the dimensions are given equal (one-fourth) 
weight in the final index. This means that diffusion of technology is, effectively, given 
more weight - two of the four dimensions deal with this. (For an example on how the 
index is calculated, appendix 1: Calculating the Technology Achievement Index.) 
 
TAI values and rankings  
TAI estimates have been prepared for 72 countries for which data are available and of 
acceptable quality and are shown in Table 1. For others, data were missing or 
unsatisfactory for one or more indicators, so the TAI could not be estimated. For a 
number of countries in the developing world, data on patents and royalties are missing. 
Because a lack of data generally indicates that little formal innovation is occurring, a 
value of zero for the missing indicator was used in these cases.  
 
Global patterns  
The results show three trends: a map of great disparities among countries, diversity and 
dynamism in technological progress among developing countries and a map of 
technology hubs superimposed on countries at different levels of development. The map 
of great disparities shows four group of countries (see map 2.1), with TAI values ranging 
from 0.744 for Finland to 0.066 for Mozambique. These countries can be considered 
leaders, potential leaders, dynamic adopters or marginalized:   13  
•  Leaders (TAI above 0.5)—topped by Finland, the United States, Sweden and Japan, 
this group is at the cutting edge of technological innovation. Technological 
innovation is self-sustaining, and these countries have high achievements in 
technology creation, diffusion and skills. Coming fifth is the Republic of Korea, and 
eighth is Singapore— two countries that have advanced rapidly in technology in 
recent decades. This group is set apart from the rest by its higher invention index, 
with a marked gap between Israel in this group and Spain in the next.  
•  Potential leaders (0.35–0.49)—most of these countries have invested in high levels of 
human skills and have diffused old technologies widely but innovate little. Each tends 
to rank low in one or two dimensions, such as diffusion of recent innovations or of 
old inventions. Most countries in this group have skill levels comparable to those in 
the top group.  
•  Dynamic adopters (0.20–0.34)—these countries are dynamic in the use of new 
technology. Most are developing countries with significantly higher human skills than 
the fourth group. Included are Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Africa and 
Tunisia, among others. Many of these countries have important high-technology 
industries and technology hubs, but the diffusion of old inventions is slow and 
incomplete.  
•  Marginalized (below 0.20)—technology diffusion and skill building have a long way 
to go in these countries. Large parts of the population have not benefited from the 
diffusion of old technology. These rankings do not shadow income rankings and 
show considerable dynamism in several countries with rising technological 
achievement— for example, Korea ranks above the United Kingdom, Canada and 
other established industrial economies. Ireland ranks above Austria and France. Large 
developing countries—Brazil, China, India—do less well than one might expect 
because this is not a ranking of “technological might” of a country. Finally, 
technology hubs have a limited effect on the index because of disparities within 
countries. If the TAI were estimated only for the hubs, such countries would 
undoubtedly rank as leaders or potential leaders.   14  
These rankings do not shadow income rankings and show considerable dynamism in 
countries with rising technological achievements – for example, Korea ranks above the 
United Kingdom, Canada and other well established industrial countries.  Ireland ranks 
above France.      
Policy priorities for countries 
A look at a country’s TAI ranking and composition can reveal areas of strengths and 
weaknesses.  This can be illustrated by cases of Brazil,  Mexico and India. 
 
BRAZIL - Brazil is one of the most dynamic countries in Latin America, having two 
world class technology hubs in Sao Paolo and Rio de Janeiro,  being in the forefront of 
policy initiatives in global fora in areas such as the management of intellectual property.  
Yet  the country ranks relatively poorly in the TAI at 43rd place, behind a number of 
other developing countries such as Malaysia, Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica, Chile, 
Uruguay, Thailand, South Africa.   Why?   
 
First, the diffusion of old inventions – telephones and electricity – has been slow.  Brazil 
lags far behind such countries as Malaysia, Argentina, and Chile.  The likelihood is that 
these basic technologies that have been around for a century still have not reached rural 
communities and poorer families.  And these two technologies are fundamental building 
blocks to being fully linked to the new technologies driving progress in the 21st century.   
 
Second, Brazil lags behind in training people with skills.  For example, enrolment of 
Brazilian students in science and mathematics in post secondary education is only 3.2% 
of the age group, far less than 13.2% in Chile, or 7.3 % in Uruguay. Developing countries 
that have made the most rapid progress in technological achievements – Korea and 
Singapore – have invested heavily  in education.  Gross enrolment rates are over 20%.   
Mean years of schooling in Brazil is 4.9 years compared with 6.8 years in Malaysia, 8.8 
years in Argentina and 7.2 years in Mexico and 6.1 years in South Africa.   The 
proportion of students in universities and other tertiary level institutions enrolled in  15  
science and mathematics is only 3.2% of the age group in contrast to over 10% in 
Argentina, Chile, and the OECD average.   
 
Technological advance is more rapid and more fundamental than it has been ever before 
in any historical era.  Workers have to adapt to new technologies all the time, and that 
means that basic education is a necessity. Does Brazil’s education system need to be 
rethought  to meeting the challenges of the network age? 
 
Third, Brazil is doing better than Argentina and Chile in entering the high tech export 
markets.  But is this leading to linkages to dynamic development of the rest of the 
economy?  Are the employers providing training for workers?  Experience of leading 
countries that have successfully used technology for sustained economic growth and for 
equitable development show high levels of commitment to diffusion of technology 
widely through the population, and to the development of human skills.   Diverse 
countries such as Finland, Korea, Singapore all adopted very proactive policies for 
increasing quantity and quality of education in science and mathematics scoring not only 
high in enrolment levels but also in international performance tests, and provided many 
incentives for businesses to train their workers.  They have also introduced invested 
heavily in the diffusion of technology. 
 
While Brazil is leading the way in participating in the network age with its world-class 
hubs and pioneering policies for making new technologies work for human development, 
it still has a long way to go in spreading technological progress throughout the country, to 
all its people. 
 
MEXICO - In contrast to Brazil, Mexico does well in the index, ranking number 32 out 
of 72 countries, higher than any other developing country except for the four Asian 
Tigers and cubs – Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia, and outranks Argentina, 
Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil.   
  16  
While Mexico’s high score is due first and foremost to its success in one measure - 66% 
of her export earnings come from high and medium tech products.  This is one of the 
highest levels in the world.  The only other countries that have over 60% of export 
earnings from high and medium technology products are the US, Japan, Korea, UK and 
Germany, Hungary and Malaysia. This clearly shows Mexico’s extraordinary success in 
using new technologies.  It shows that the country has responded very positively to the 
niche opportunities that are being created in the global market.  High tech sector has been 
the most rapidly growing sector of the global economy in the last decade.   
 
Yet other indicators show that Mexico has a long way to go in developing its 
technological capacity, and in translating that for the purposes of sustainable 
development for all its citizens.    
 
First, the diffusion of old inventions – telephones and electricity – has been slow.  
Mexico lags far behind such countries as Malaysia, Argentina, and Chile.  The likelihood 
is that these basic technologies that have been around for a century still have not reached 
rural communities and poorer families.  And these two technologies are fundamental 
building blocks to being fully linked to the new technologies driving progress in  the 21st 
century.   How bad is the technological divide within Mexico?   
 
Second, the development of human skills is another fundamental building block of 
technological capacity.  Here again, Mexico can do much more, especially in science and 
maths training.  Mexico has made significant progress in improving overall education, 
achieving 7.2 years of schooling, a level comparable to Chile, Uruguay, Italy and 
Malaysia.  Yet the proportion of students in universities and other tertiary level 
institutions enrolled in science and mathematics is only 5% of the age group in contrast to 
over 10% in Argentina, Chile, and the OECD average.  In an age of rapid technological 
advance, workers have to adapt to new technologies all the time, and that means that 
basic education is a necessity.  Is Mexico’s education system adequate to meeting the 
challenges of the network age? 
  17  
Third, much of the exports are from foreign direct investment.  Is this leading to linkages 
to dynamic development of the rest of the economy in Mexico?  Are the employers 
providing training for workers?  Is Mexico able to climb up the skill ladder and move into 
more skill intensive segments of the high and medium tech industries? 
 
Mexico’s high rank in the Technology Achievement Index (TAI)  reflects the country’s 
technological success in using advanced technology and the ability to compete 
successfully in  the technology based global marketplace.   But there is a long way to go 
in  diffusing technology  –  reaching poor people and empowering them to lift themselves 
out of poverty.    Experience of leading countries that have successfully used technology 
for sustained economic growth and for equitable development show high levels of 
commitment to diffusion of technology widely through the population, and to the 
development of human skills.   Diverse countries such as Finland, Korea, Singapore all 
adopted very proactive policies for increasing quantity and quality of education in science 
and mathematics scoring not only high in enrolment levels but also in international 
performance tests, and provided many incentives for businesses to train their workers.  
They have also introduced invested heavily in the diffusion of technology. 
 
The Technology Achievement Index for Mexico is a starting point for debates on national 
technology policies – not for technology but for the use of technology in development 
that is dynamic and equitable.   
 
INDIA – India has achieved showcase success in exploiting the opportunities of the 
network age.  The ICT industry exports rose from $150 million to nearly $4 billion in 
1999.   Bangalore is a world - class hub, and other centres of technological innovation are 
emerging and developing.   Yet the country only 63 of 72 countries, at the bottom of the 
group of ‘dynamic adopters’.    Why? 
 
First, while the country has considerable capacity in state of the art technological 
innovation in new technologies, the TAI shows that these technological advances are not 
widespread.  The country still only has 28 telephones per 1000 people, compared, for  18  
example with 238 in Brazil, or 192 in Mexico.  Mean years of schooling is only 5.1, 
whereas countries in the ‘potential leaders’ category  have achieved more typically 8 or 9 
years.  It is also well known that rural electrification has a long way to go.  The diffusion 
of technology has not been widespread, and the world class capacity to innovate has not 
been translated into patents or royalties and licence earnings to any significant level.   
 
Second, India is a large country with a very large population.  This has tended to dilute 
the strengths of the country in worldclass innovations. 
Towards further developments  
While this index provides interesting information for policy makers, further work is 
needed to develop a more complete measure of technological achievements.  To do so 
requires overcoming the limitations of both concept and data. 
 
In concept, this index measure only technological achievements, not those that are 
relevant for human development. Technological achievements measured could be used as 
much for destructive purposes as for human well being.  The index does not indicate how 
well these achievements have been translated into human development. The index is also 
incomplete. A nation’s technological achievements are larger and more complex than 
what this or any other index can capture. It is impossible to reflect the full range of 
technologies—from agriculture to medicine to manufacturing. Many aspects of 
technology creation, diffusion and human skills are hard to quantify. And even if they 
could be quantified, a lack of reliable data makes it impossible to fully reflect them. For 
example, important technological innovations occur in the informal sector and in 
indigenous knowledge systems. But these are not recorded and cannot be quantified. 
Thus the TAI is constructed using indicators, not direct measures, of a country’s 
achievements in four dimensions. It provides a rough summary—not a comprehensive 
measure—of a society’s technological achievements. 
 
The index is also incomplete in country coverage - limited in coverage to 72 out of the 
nearly 200 countries of the world.  While this is broader than that achieved by some of  19  
the indexes, it is still far from idea, and is due to lack of data in international series. The 
data used to construct the TAI are from international series that are the most widely used 
in analyses of technology trends, and so are considered the most reliable of available sets, 
as shown below. The range of appropriate indicators is limited to those with reasonable 
coverage. Limitations in data series must be taken into account in interpreting TAI values 
and rankings. Some countries will have undervalued innovations because patent records 
and royalty payments are the only systematically collected data on technological 
innovation and leave out valuable but non-commercialized innovations such as those 
occurring in the informal sector and in indigenous knowledge systems. Moreover, 
national systems and traditions differ in scope and criteria. High numbers of patents may 
reflect liberal intellectual property systems. Diffusion of new technologies may be 
understated in many developing countries. Internet access is measured by Internet hosts 
because these data are more reliable and have better coverage than Internet user data at 
the country level.    (For detailed description of data sources, see appendix ss)   
 
As technology policies gain prominence in development strategies, it is likely that 
progress would be made in overcoming both the data and conceptual limitations.  
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APPENDIX 1 
CALCULATING THE TECHNOLOGY ACHIEVEMENT INDEX 
 
 
This illustration of the calculation of the TAI uses data for New Zealand for various years in 1997–2000. 
1. Calculating the technology creation index 
Patents and receipts of royalties and license fees are used to approximate the level of 
technology creation. Indices for the two indicators are calculated according to the general 
formula. 
 
Patent index = (103 – 0) / (994 – 0) = 0.104 
 
Royalty and license fee index = (13.0 – 0.0) / (272.6 – 0.0) = 0.048 
 
The technology creation index is the simple average of these two indices: 
 
Technology creation index = (0.103 + 0.048) / 2 = 0.076 
 
2. Calculating the diffusion of recent innovations index 
Using Internet hosts and the share of high- and medium-technology exports in total goods 
exports, the same formula is applied to calculate the diffusion of recent innovations 
index. 
 
Internet host index = (146.7 – 0.0) / (232.4 – 0.0) = 0.631 
 
High- and medium-technology export index = (15.4 – 0.0) / (80.8 – 0.0) = 0.191 
 
Diffusion of recent innovations index = (0.631 + 0.190) / 2 = 0.411 
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3. Calculating the diffusion of old innovations index 
The two indicators used to represent the diffusion of old innovations are telephones 
(mainline and cellular) and electricity consumption per capita. For these, the indices are 
calculated using the logarithm of the value, and the upper goalpost is the OECD average. 
For a detailed discussion see box 2.12 in chapter 2.  
 
Telephony index = (log 720 – log 1) / (log 901 – log 1) = 0.967 
 
For electricity consumption New Zealand’s value is capped at 6,914, since it exceeds the 
goalpost. 
 
Electricity index = (log 6,969 – log 22) / (log 6,969 – log 22) = 1.000 
 
Diffusion of old innovations index = (0.966 + 1.000) / 2 = 0.984 
 
4. Calculating the human skills index 
The human skills index is calculated according to the general formula, using mean years 
of schooling and the gross tertiary science enrolment ratio. 
 
Mean years of schooling index = (11.7 – 0.8) / (12.0 – 0.8) = 0.973 
 
Gross tertiary science enrolment index = (13.1 – 0.1) / (27.3 – 0.1) = 0.474 
 
Human skills index = (0.990 + 0.477) / 2 = 0.725 
 
5. Calculating the technology achievement index 
A simple average of the four dimension indices gives us the technology achievement 
index. 
 
TAI = (0.076 + 0.411 + 0.984 + 0.725) / 4 = 0.549  22  
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Appendix 2. Statistics on technology 
Technology creation 
The capacity for technology creation is a complex and dynamic system that cannot be 
fully captured by any particular indicator. And on a global scale, there is very little 
quantitative data on technology creation. For these reasons, it is impossible to give an 
accurate picture of technology creation capacity using only statistical evidence. 
Nonetheless, the data give a good indication of how technology creation capacity is 
distributed.  
Patents 
Patents are an often-used measure of innovation. Patents are clearly a very important 
indicator of innovative activity, as has been shown in numerous studies.  
What complicates the use of patent data is that patent regulations vary widely from 
country to country. Some countries allow patents on e.g. plant varieties or business 
methods, others do not. Also, many developing countries have weak national patent 
offices, and so residents of these countries might choose to apply for patents in other 
countries directly. Business practices in some countries produce large number of patent 
applications that are not directly related to innovations. Also, industry structure has an 
impact: different industry sectors patent to varying degrees. 
There are two main patent indicators used to measure innovation: first time patent 
applications filed by residents, and patents granted to residents. For the TAI, patents 
granted was chosen, in order not to count applications that were not awarded patents. 
However, the time between application and grant is about three years, introducing an 
extra time lag in the index.  
Receipts of royalties and license fees 
Royalties and license fees are, effectively, payments for the use of the intellectual 
property. As such, this data gives valuable information on the stock of innovations – 
which countries are and have been successful in building capacity for technology 
creation. But like all other indicators, these data are not perfect. Widely available data 
includes only payments received from abroad – not domestic payments. This penalizes 
large countries, who are less internationally oriented. The second problem is that the data 
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include payments not only for the use of innovations, but also other kinds of intellectual 
property, such as publishing rights.  
Publications of scientific articles 
The production of scientific articles is an established measure of scientific activity. There 
are however serious problems with this measure. Some of the most important: 
•  The selection of publications where articles are counted. Existing measures, such as 
ISI, suffer from a heavy Anglo-Saxon bias.  
•  Scientific articles are only one output of science. It does not directly measure such 
things as the quality of higher education or technical skills. 
•  The output of articles depends very much on the structure of R&D. In some 
disciplines, such as medicine, researchers publish many more articles per year than in 
others.  
These reasons make this indicator unsuitable for the TAI.  
Research and development expenditures (as % of GNP) 
A country’s expenditure on research and development, usually as a percentage of GNP, is 
a widely used measure of a country’s efforts in technology creation. It is not an indicator 
of achievement.  
 
Diffusion of technology 
Manufacturing 
Using technology in manufacturing is on important aspect of technology diffusion. There 
are two different approaches to measuring technology content in manufacturing: sectoral 
and product-based. The sectoral approach tries to classify different industries according 
to their technology intensity. Recent work by OECD in this field highlights some major 
problems with this approach. On the conceptual level, it is not clear if technology 
intensity means using technology or producing technology. Beyond this conceptual 
problem, there are several practical problems. The most serious one is of cross-country 
comparability. Any particular industry (e.g. textiles) could be low-technology in one 
country but high-technology in another. Especially when comparing developing countries 
with developed, this is highly problematic. 
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The product-based escapes these problems by measuring technology intensity of 
products, not sectors. Products in the same category by definition have the same 
technology content. 
Because of the constraints of available data, exports were used as a proxy for 
manufacturing – the structure of exports is closely related to the structure of 
manufacturing for most countries.  
There are different classification methods for exports by technology content. The OECD 
has proposed one, based on product categories in the export classification system known 
as Standard Industry and Trade Classification (SITC) revision 3. This is a very detailed 
classification system. However, the OECD proposal only studies high-technology 
exports. Many poor countries have very little or no high-technology exports. To 
distinguish between these it is important to also study take medium-technology exports. 
For this reason, a classification by Lall (2000) was used in the TAI. This classification is 
based on SITC revision 2, which is less detailed but enables trend analysis. The 
classification distuingishes between high-, medium- and low technology exports, as well 
as resource-based manufactures and primary products.  
Internet / computing 
There is a number of ways of measuring Internet diffusion. Of primary interest is how 
many people have the possibility to use the Internet should they have the need. However, 
as in many other cases the availability of data for developing countries is a major 
constraint. For many developing countries, Internet user surveys are of very poor quality 
or non-existent. User data are very often estimates with no basis in observations.  
Measuring Internet hosts instead of users is an attempt to escape these problems. A host 
is, in essence, a computer connected to the Internet. This is straightforward to count. 
While the number of Internet-connected computers does not directly tell us how many 
users there are, it gives a good indication, and data are available for practically all 
countries.  
Electricity 
Electricity is an old technology that is still not diffused to large parts of the world. It is 
crucial to almost all forms of technological development. Therefore, it is of great 
importance when measuring technology diffusion. The problem in measurement is that 
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no data is available on the national level on how many people have access to electricity. 
The closest proxy available is consumption – the more people have access to electricity, 
the higher consumption. Of course, other factors, such as geography, also influence 
consumption.  
Telephony / Telefax 
Telephones are another old technology where diffusion has stalled, and one that is 
important to many other aspects of technological development. Fortunately, telephony 
diffusion is also easy to measure. Data on the number of telephone subscribers, both of 
landlines and cellular telephones, are widely available.  
Human skills 
Human skills are vital to be able to adapt to new technological realities, and are thus 
included in the TAI. Two indicators are used: mean years of schooling and the gross 
tertiary science enrolment ratio.  
Mean years of schooling 
Mean years of schooling is the average number of years of school completed in the 
population of age 15 and above. While this measure does not take into account 
differences in the quality of schooling, it gives an indication of the level of human skills 
in the population.  
To create these estimates, a combination of survey data on school attainment and time-
series data on enrolment was used. The survey data gives information on proportions of 
the population that have completed primary, secondary and tertiary education. This data 
is available for about 40 percent of data points. Where this data is not available, trend 
data on gross enrolment, adjusted for repeaters, is used to estimate the proportions of the 
population having attained primary, secondary and tertiary education.  
In the second step these attainment levels are multiplied by the duration of the respective 
level in different countries to produce an estimate on the average years of schooling. 
These estimates are produced for two different groups, the population age 15 and above 
and the population age 25 and above. For the TAI, the prior was chosen since it 
corresponds more closely to the age of the workforce, particularly in developing 
countries. 
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Enrolment data 
Mean years of schooling is an indicator that moves very slowly. To reflect present efforts 
in building a technology skill base, it is useful to study enrolment data. While primary 
and secondary education are important, we identified tertiary science education is vital to 
have the capacity to adapt to new technologies. This indicator refers to the number of 
students enrolled in technical and scientific tertiary education, as a share of the 
population in the relevant age range (19-24 for most countries). The indicator used in the 
TAI is the gross tertiary science enrolment ratio, which refers to the number of students 
enrolled in technical and scientific tertiary education, as a share of the population in the 
relevant age range (19-24 for most countries). 
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Table 1 - Technology achievement index 
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Leaders                                             
1 Finland  0.744 187 125.6 200.2 50.7 1,203 d 14,129 e 10.0
2 United  States  0.733 289 130.0 179.1 66.2 993 d 11,832 e 12.1
3 Sweden  0.703 271 156.6 125.8 59.7 1,247 d 13,955 e 11.4
4 Japan  0.698 994 64.6 49.0 80.8 1,007 d 7,322 e 9.5
5  Korea, Rep. of  0.666 779 9.8 4.8 66.7 938 d 4,497 10.8
6 Netherlands  0.630 189 151.2 136.0 50.9 1,042 d 5,908 9.4
7 United  Kingdom  0.606 82 134.0 57.4 61.9 1,037 d 5,327 9.4
8 Singapore  0.591 8 14.6 h,i 72.3 74.9 901 6,771 7.1
9 Canada  0.589 31 38.6 108.0 48.7 881 15,071 e 11.6
10 Australia  0.587 75 18.2 125.9 16.2 862 8,717 e 10.9
11 Germany  0.583 235 36.8 41.2 64.2 874 5,681 10.2
12 Norway  0.579 103 20.2 i 193.6 19.0 1,329 d 24,607 e 11.9
13 Ireland  0.566 106 110.3 48.6 53.6 924 d 4,760 9.4
14 Belgium  0.553 72 73.9 58.9 47.6 817 7,249 e 9.3
15 New  Zealand  0.548 103 13.0 146.7 15.4 720 8,215 e 11.7
16 Austria  0.544 165 14.8 84.2 50.3 987 d 6,175 8.4
17 France  0.535 205 33.6 36.4 58.9 943 d 6,287 7.9
18 Israel  0.514 74 43.6 43.2 45.0 918 d 5,475 9.6
Potential leaders                                             
19 Spain  0.481 42 8.6 21.0 53.4 730 4,195 7.3
20 Italy  0.471 13 9.8 30.4 51.0 991 d 4,431 7.2
21 Czech  Republic  0.465 28 4.2 25.0 51.7 560 4,748 9.5
22 Hungary  0.464 26 6.2 21.6 63.5 533 2,888 9.1
23 Slovenia  0.458 105 4.0 20.3 49.5 687 5,096 7.1
24 Hong  Kong,  China  (SAR)  0.455 6 .. 33.6 33.6 1,212 d 5,244 9.4
25 Slovakia  0.447 24 2.7 10.2 48.7 478 3,899 9.3
26 Greece  0.437 (.) 0.0 j 16.4 17.9 839 3,739 8.7
27 Portugal  0.419 6 2.7 17.7 40.7 892 3,396 5.9
28 Bulgaria  0.411 23 .. 3.7 30.0 i 397 3,166 9.5
29 Poland  0.407 30 0.6 11.4 36.2 365 2,458 9.8
30 Malaysia  0.396 .. 0.0 2.4 67.4 340 2,554 6.8
31 Croatia  0.391 9 .. 6.7 41.7 431 2,463 6.3
32 Mexico  0.389 1 0.4 9.2 66.3 192 1,513 7.2
33 Cyprus  0.386 .. .. 16.9 23.0 735 3,468 9.2
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34 Argentina  0.381 8 0.5 8.7 19.0 322 1,891 8.8
35 Romania  0.371 71 0.2 2.7 25.3 227 1,626 9.5
36 Costa  Rica  0.358 .. 0.3 4.1 52.6 239 1,450 6.1
37 Chile  0.357 .. 6.6 6.2 6.1 358 2,082 7.6
Dynamic adopters                                             
38 Uruguay  0.343 2 0.0 j 19.6 13.3 366 1,788 7.6
39 South  Africa  0.340 .. 1.7 8.4 30.2 k 270 3,832 6.1
40 Thailand  0.337 1 0.3 1.6 48.9 124 1,345 6.5
41 Trinidad  and  Tobago  0.328 .. 0.0 i 7.7 14.2 246 3,478 7.8
42 Panama  0.321 .. 0.0 1.9 5.1 251 1,211 8.6
43 Brazil  0.311 2 0.8 7.2 32.9 238 1,793 4.9
44 Philippines  0.300 (.) 0.1 0.4 32.8 77 451 8.2
45 China  0.299 1 0.1 0.1 39.0 120 746 6.4
46 Bolivia  0.277 .. 0.2 0.3 26.0 113 409 5.6
47 Colombia  0.274 1 0.2 1.9 13.7 236 866 5.3
48 Peru  0.271 .. 0.2 0.7 2.9 107 642 7.6
49 Jamaica  0.261 .. 2.4 0.4 1.5 i 255 2,252 5.3
50  Iran, Islamic Rep. of  0.260 1 0.0 i (.) 2.0 133 1,343 5.3
51 Tunisia  0.255 .. 1.1 (.) 19.7 96 824 5.0
52 Paraguay  0.254 .. 35.3 0.5 2.0 137 756 6.2
53 Ecuador  0.253 .. .. 0.3 3.2 122 625 6.4
54 El  Salvador  0.253 .. 0.2 0.3 19.2 138 559 5.2
55 Dominican  Republic  0.244 .. .. 1.7 5.7 i 148 627 4.9
56 Syrian  Arab  Republic  0.240 .. .. 0.0 1.2 102 838 5.8
57 Egypt  0.236 (.) 0.7 0.1 8.8 77 861 5.5
58 Algeria  0.221 .. .. (.) 1.0 54 563 5.4
59 Zimbabwe  0.220 (.) .. 0.5 12.0 36 896 5.4
60 Indonesia  0.211 .. .. 0.2 17.9 40 320 5.0
61 Honduras  0.208 .. 0.0 (.) 8.2 57 446 4.8
62 Sri  Lanka  0.203 .. .. 0.2 5.2 49 244 6.9
63 India  0.201 1 (.) 0.1 16.6 i 28 384 5.1
Marginalized                                             
64 Nicaragua  0.185 .. .. 0.4 3.6 39 281 4.6
65 Pakistan  0.167 .. (.) j 0.1 7.9 24 337 3.9
66 Senegal  0.158 .. 0.0 j 0.2 28.5 27 111 2.6
67 Ghana  0.139 (.) .. (.) 4.1 12 289 3.9
68 Kenya  0.129 (.) (.) 0.2 7.2 11 129 4.2
69 Nepal  0.081 .. 0.0 0.1 1.9 i 12 47 2.4
70  Tanzania, U. Rep. of  0.080 .. (.) (.) 6.7 6 54 2.7
71 Sudan  0.071 .. 0.0 0.0 0.4 i 9 47 2.1
72 Mozambique  0.066 .. .. (.) 12.2 i 5 54 1.1
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Others                                                
  Afghanistan . .. .. 0.0 .. 1 .. 1.7
  Albania . .. .. 0.1 4.2 i 39 678 ..
  American Samoa  . .. .. .. .. 248 .. ..
  Andorra . .. .. 23.2 .. 722 .. ..
  Angola . .. .. (.) .. 10 60 ..
  A n g u i l l a  . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .
  Antigua and Barbuda  . .. .. 6.6 .. 602 .. ..
  Armenia . 8 .. 0.9 11.7 158 930 ..
  Aruba . .. .. 5.0 53.5 i 494 .. ..
  Azerbaijan . .. .. 0.1 6.3 118 1,584 ..
  Bahamas . .. .. .. .. 422 .. ..
  Bahrain . .. .. 3.6 5.7 i 453 7,645 6.1
  Bangladesh . (.) (.) 0.0 2.9 i 5 81 2.6
  Barbados . .. 0.8 0.5 31.3 538 .. 8.7
  Belarus . 50 0.1 0.3 46.5 259 2,762 ..
  Belize . .. 0.0 i 2.2 0.2 l 182 .. ..
  Benin . .. .. (.) .. .. 46 2.3
  Bermuda . .. .. 95.8 .. .. .. ..
  Bhutan . .. .. 2.1 .. 18 .. ..
  Bosnia and Herzegovina  . .. .. 1.0 .. 110 539 ..
  Botswana . 1 (.) 2.7 .. 150 .. 6.3
  British Virgin Islands  . .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
  Brunei Darussalam  . .. .. 8.0 .. 451 7,676 ..
  Burkina Faso  . .. .. (.) .. 5 .. ..
  Burundi . .. 0.0 0.0 .. 3 .. ..
  Cambodia . .. .. (.) .. 11 .. ..
  Cameroon . .. .. (.) 2.2 i .. 185 3.5
  Cape Verde  . .. (.) i 0.1 .. 131 .. ..
  C a y m a n  I s l a n d s   . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .
  Central African Republic  . .. .. (.) 13.6 i .. .. 2.5
  Chad . .. .. (.) .. .. .. ..
  Comoros . .. .. 0.1 .. 10 .. ..
  Congo . .. 0.0 j (.) .. .. 83 5.1
  Congo, Dem. Rep. of the  . .. .. (.) .. .. 110 3.0
  C o o k  I s l a n d s   . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .
  Côte d'Ivoire  . .. .. 0.1 .. 33 .. ..
  Cuba . .. .. 0.1 .. 39 954 7.7
  Denmark . 52 .. 114.3 41.0 1,179 6,033 9.7
  Djibouti . .. .. 0.1 .. 14 .. ..
  Dominica . .. 0.0 i 4.1 50.7 l .. .. ..
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  E a s t  T i m o r   . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .
  Equatorial Guinea  . .. .. 0.0 .. .. .. ..
  Eritrea . .. .. (.) .. 7 .. ..
  Estonia . 1 1.2 43.1 31.9 624 3,531 ..
  Ethiopia . .. .. (.) .. 3 22 ..
  Faeroe Islands  . .. .. 52.5 3.9 798 .. ..
  Falkland Islands (Malvinas)  . .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
  Fiji . .. .. 0.9 .. 130 .. 8.3
  French Guiana  . .. .. 1.4 .. 386 .. ..
  French Polynesia  . .. .. 9.3 .. 321 .. ..
  Gabon . .. .. (.) 0.9 i 39 749 ..
  Gambia . 1 .. (.) .. 27 .. 2.3
  Georgia . 67 .. 0.4 .. 142 1,257 ..
  G i b r a l t a r  . . .. . . .. . 9 3 5 d . . . .
  Greenland . .. .. 70.8 0.6 698 .. ..
  Grenada . .. .. 0.1 1.7 l 337 .. ..
  Guadeloupe . .. .. 2.3 .. 643 .. ..
  Guam . .. .. 1.5 .. .. .. ..
  Guatemala . (.) .. 0.5 16.0 86 322 3.5
  Guinea . .. .. (.) .. 9 .. ..
  Guinea-Bissau . .. .. (.) .. .. .. 0.8
  Guyana . .. .. 0.1 .. 78 .. 6.3
  Haiti . .. .. 0.0 3.2 i 12 33 2.8
  H o l y  S e e   . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .
  Iceland . 15 .. 232.4 9.8 1,297 20,150 8.8
  Îles Turques et Caïques  . .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
  Îles Wallis et Futuna  . .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
  Iraq . .. .. 0.0 .. 30 1,359 4.0
  I s l e  o f  M a n   . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .
  Jordan . .. .. 0.2 .. 105 1,205 6.9
  Kazakhstan . 55 .. 0.6 15.0 111 2,399 ..
  Kiribati . .. .. 1.0 .. 45 .. ..
  K o r e a ,  D e m .  R e p .   . . .. . . .. . 4 6 . . . .
  Kuwait . .. .. 4.4 6.8 398 13,800 6.2
  Kyrgyzstan . 14 .. 1.1 10.9 77 1,431 ..
  Lao People's Dem.  Rep.  . .. .. 0.0 .. 8 .. ..
  Latvia . 71 4.3 13.4 12.4 412 1,879 ..
  Lebanon . .. .. 2.3 .. .. 1,820 ..
  Lesotho . .. 6.5 0.1 .. .. .. 4.2
  Liberia . .. .. (.) .. .. .. 2.5
  Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  . .. .. (.) 1.8 i .. 3,677 ..
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  Liechtenstein . .. .. .. .. 902 d .. ..
  Lithuania . 27 (.) 7.5 29.2 401 1,909 ..
  Luxembourg . 202 272.6 49.5 34.0 1,211 12,400 ..
  Macau . .. .. 0.7 3.7 610 .. ..
  Macedonia, TFYR  . 19 1.1 1.9 23.8 i 258 .. ..
  Madagascar . .. (.) i 0.1 3.0 .. .. ..
  Malawi . .. .. 0.0 .. 6 .. 3.2
  Maldives . .. 0.0 j 1.7 .. 90 .. ..
  Mali . .. .. (.) .. .. .. 0.9
  Malta . 18 0.0 19.5 72.0 609 3,719 ..
  Marshall Islands  . .. .. 0.1 .. .. .. ..
  Martinique . .. .. 1.6 .. 698 .. ..
  Mauritania . .. 0.0 i (.) .. 6 .. ..
  Mauritius . .. 0.0 5.2 4.3 312 .. 6.0
  Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  . .. .. 6.2 .. .. .. ..
  Moldova, Rep. of  . 42 (.) 0.7 6.2 131 689 ..
  Monaco . 641 .. .. .. .. .. ..
  Mongolia . 56 0.4 0.1 3.2 i 53 .. ..
  Montserrat . .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
  Morocco . 3 0.2 0.1 12.4 i 66 443 ..
  Myanmar . .. (.) 0.0 .. 6 64 2.8
  Namibia . .. 3.5 i 3.7 .. 82 .. ..
  N a u r u  . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .
  Netherlands Antilles  . .. .. 0.9 .. .. 4,118 ..
  New Caledonia  . .. .. 2.3 .. 362 .. ..
  Niger . .. .. (.) .. .. .. 1.0
  Nigeria . .. .. (.) 0.4 .. 85 ..
  N i u e  . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .
  N o r f o l k  I s l a n d   . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .
  Northern Mariana Islands  . .. .. 0.5 .. 526 .. ..
  Occupied Palestinian Territory  . .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
  Oman . .. .. 1.4 13.2 139 2,828 ..
  P a l a u  . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .
  Papua New Guinea  . .. .. 0.1 .. 14 .. 2.9
  P i t c a i r n  . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .
  Puerto Rico  . .. .. 0.6 .. 542 .. ..
  Qatar . .. .. .. .. 406 13,912 ..
  Reunion . .. .. (.) .. .. .. ..
  Russian Federation  . 131 0.3 3.5 16.0 220 3,937 ..
  Rwanda . .. 0.0 0.1 .. 3 .. 2.6
  Saint Helena  . .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
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  Saint Kitts and Nevis  . .. .. 0.2 30.6 i 536 .. ..
  Saint Lucia  . .. .. 0.2 5.4 i .. .. ..
  Saint Pierre and Miquelon  . .. .. .. 1.2 .. .. ..
  Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  . .. .. (.) 2.0 i 221 .. ..
  Samoa (Western)  . .. .. 5.3 .. .. .. ..
  S a n  M a r i n o   . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .
  Sao Tome and Principe  . .. .. 8.6 .. 31 .. ..
  Saudi Arabia  . (.) 0.0 0.3 5.2 i 170 4,692 ..
  Seychelles . .. .. 0.1 (.) i .. .. ..
  Sierra Leone  . .. .. 0.1 .. .. .. 2.4
  Solomon Islands  . .. 0.1 1.4 .. 21 .. ..
  Somalia . .. .. 0.0 .. .. .. ..
  Suriname . .. 0.0 i 0.0 1.0 i 213 .. ..
  Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands  . .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
  Swaziland . .. 0.2 1.4 .. 45 .. 6.0
  Switzerland . 183 .. 82.7 63.6 1,109 6,981 10.5
  Taiwan Province of China  . .. .. 74.3 61.3 i 1,068 d 6,287 8.8
  Tajikistan . 2 .. 0.1 .. 35 2,046 ..
  Togo . .. .. 0.1 0.4 12 .. 3.3
  T o k e l a u  . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .
  Tonga . .. .. 82.6 .. 94 .. ..
  Turkey . (.) .. 2.5 26.7 384 1,353 5.3
  Turkmenistan . 10 .. 0.3 .. 83 859 ..
  T u v a l u  . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .
  Uganda . .. 0.0 j (.) 2.2 5 .. 3.5
  Ukraine . 84 .. 1.2 .. 203 2,350 ..
  United Arab Emirates  . .. .. 20.9 .. 754 9,892 ..
  Uzbekistan . 25 .. (.) .. 68 1,618 ..
  Vanuatu . .. .. 1.6 .. .. .. ..
  Venezuela . .. 0.0 1.2 6.2 253 2,566 6.6
  Viet Nam  . .. .. (.) .. 31 232 ..
  Virgin Islands (U.S.)  . .. .. 9.2 .. .. .. ..
  Western Sahara  . .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
  Yemen . .. .. (.) .. 18 96 ..
  Yugoslavia . 19 .. 2.4 23.4 i 271 .. ..
  Zambia . (.) .. 0.2 .. 12 539 5.5
   
                                                 
                               
                               
a. For purposes of calculating the TAI a value of zero was used for countries for which no data were available. 
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b. For purposes of calculating the TAI a value of zero was used for non-OECD countries for which no data were available. 
c. Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified. 
d. For purposes of calculating the TAI the weighted average value for OECD countries (901) was used. 
e. For purposes of calculating the TAI the weighted average value for OECD countries (6,969) was used. 
f. Data refer to the most recent year available during the period 1989-94. 
g. Data are based on preliminary UNESCO estimates of the tertiary gross enrolment ratio. 
h. Data from national sources. 
i. Data refer to 1998. 
j. Data refer to 1997. 
k. Data refer to the South African Customs Union, which comprises Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. 
l. Data refer to medium-technology exports only. 
                               
Source: 
Column 1: calculated on the basis of data in columns 2-9; see technical note 2 for details 
Column 2: WIPO 2001a 
Column 3: unless otherwise noted, World Bank 2001h 
Column 4: ITU 2001a 
Column 5: calculated on the basis of data on exports from Lall 2001 and UN 2001a 
Column 6: ITU 2001b 
Column 7: World Bank 2001h 
Column 8: Barro and Lee 2000 
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